



**ONLINE LIBRARY**  
([www.onekhmer.org/onlinelibrary](http://www.onekhmer.org/onlinelibrary))

**Title:** ETHICS

<b>Name of Author</b>	Sonariddh Mao and Tingru Wei
<b>Name of University</b>	Monash University
<b>Country of Study</b>	Australia
<b>Major</b>	Business Economics
<b>Degree</b>	Master
<b>Course Title</b>	Ethics
<b>Type of Document</b>	Assignment
<b>Year</b>	

- 1) The view held by those Williams calls 'defusers of subjectivism' is a view that does not lead to indifference as it involves relativist errors, hence neglecting relations between distinctions in an issue as in an example in the thought of a man in the questioning that he or the other group are both justified in protesting thus generally leaving everything as it initially was. As given by an example of moral issue in the rise of sexual morality where defusers of subjectivism may consider no differences in the morality of sexuality as it will not likely lead to moral issues, which in reality the differences in sexual morality will lead to distinctive moral issues in term of trust and lead to affect not the only parties involved but those surrounding as well because so it reflect the aspect of leaving everything unchanged. In a clearer term using an indication of a person going against a group people, it may be initially seems to be useless to a defuser of subjectivism whether in term of intellectual or physical confrontation as there is distinctive differences and incentive to a defuser of subjectivism to believe in the example of social justice as the defuser of subjectivism may only believe in just one dimension of an entity which reflected by his or her perception, thus also leaving everything as it initially was thus show impracticality in the implication.
- 2) Williams offers some reasons that support 'the defusers of subjectivism' of solely believing in a simply false reflection of subjectivism as it may contains error in relativism and strong influences of passion. In an example of a man contemplates whether to protest; if subjectivism is consistent and acceptably true thus lead a person to obsessively believe in failure to pursue any form of protest, in extent, lead this person to subjectively view and diffuse the subjectivism of failure in

protesting to other cases unless the person justifies the protest, hence he cannot be proven wrong as he strongly believe it is futile to protest thus he is cannot be proven wrong in not protesting as he disapprove of such action. In such a case there is a mistake unless the subjectivism is false thus the inconsistency ends as the person may lie about his true motive. The substitute of the given example above is the existence of objectivism, however the existence of such entity is in question from the defuser of subjectivism, as subjectivism cannot be proven wrong. Strictly bound to subjectivism, am example of a person subjectively justifies in not protesting, he thusly cannot be proven wrong, but in contrast to the other party, they also cannot be proven wrong either in comparison bases on their subjective actions if they approve of theirs action, hence if so then the person's protest is wrong if the collective's action is justified. Thus the thought of simultaneous justice and injustice creates illogically moral inconsistency. Hence 'the defuser of subjectivism' leans on one dimension of moral thought, whether he is justified or not justified thusly this could be counted as a moral thought. The moral boundary could not contain the mid-point position of simultaneous thought of being or not being injustice, hence by subjectivism, this is not a moral thought. As the man and the party are justified in protesting against each other, or vice versa, then it may not lead to indifference as it leave everything unchanged, hence no practical implication.

- 3) The argument that Williams supposes shows that 'the defusing operation' succeeds in 'certain vital aspects' is the concept of contrast of eliminatory scientific framework and core of moral disagreement. Factual findings or

objective facts may prove many things but many hypotheses may emerge in opposition, however, they cannot be all proven in scientific manner thus there exist a framework that practitioners of science oblige. Moral disagreement does not have such framework, in an example of two men with strikingly similar backgrounds in education and nurture in which participate in the same observations may still argue on the morality of such event. Thus morality diffuses differently, in contrast to indifferentism where there is a mid-point position; hence even two men with identical backgrounds may view a specific object differently on the moral level. To be precise, the disagreement does not come from the nature of background but the nature of the object of the argument; hence the nature of the argument of the object is not constant. The moral sense disperses in what should be done and the interactions of the objective, thus lead to different perception in rationality, however, after accepting the differences; the perception fades in term of rationality requirement. Thus on moral thought, there is no exact opposite to an idea, as it takes account of all moral facts and information. Thus the moral arguments may be right on theirs own accord.

- 4) The remaining difficulties does William sees for 'defusers of subjectivism' is the obscure content that is assigned to the thought in which never reflect clearly in the thought process, furthermore the subjectivists advocate no clear equivalence of the content to thought, thus for subjectivist there is no content. For morality according to subjectivists, a moral thought is practical in a sense of not a mere reflection of reality but the means to change it. However, the moral thought reflects reality but cannot change it, as it is limited. Hence the emerging issue of

intellect against will, which resides in the responsibility of principle of morality, which in term based on moral thoughts and their contents. In term due to obscurity of moral thought, the principle based on such contents seems to be weak and unreliable. The idea of realism which could easily accounts freely for many simultaneous factors and dimension of many entities cannot be reflected by mere moral thoughts, much less subjectivism which only accounts constrainedly for one dimension. Thus subjectivism does not leave everything where it was, thus subjectivism is constrained and lack of freedom. It is ultimately a matter of choice in subjectivism.

- 5) Defusers of Subjectivism might respond for the criticism from Williams by pointing at the contents of the moral thoughts providing by the core of moral disagreement thus resulting in the form of success of defusing operation as it in not only account for one factor but it only account for the impersonal consideration provided by other parties. As the requirement of rationality disperse among people, the moral thoughts stand strong in term of becoming a tool to change the world not merely reflecting it. Thus by not merely reflecting the world, subjectivism can change the world on the ground of analyzing nature of morality when the factual knowledge is hidden. As asymmetry rises in the world, the accountability of subjectivism rise by excluding the mid-point position base on one clear dimension in the content of the moral thought. Furthermore, in moral disagreement, subjectivism cannot be proven wrong, thus the attitudes may prevail in their own accords, which bases on their one dimension of clear fact. In an example of two people, one prefers the beach to being indoor, and the opposite

in another, still none of them can proven another wrong base on one's preference as they have one clear dimension in making their choices and attitude better than the other.

REFERENCE:

Williams, B. (1993). *Morality: Introduction to Ethics*. London: Cambridge University Press.